cbarge
World Famous Barge in a Budget
So a LOT of of 440 B body cop cars were ordered before the end of the line.
What killed Plymouth's Formal?
- Thread starter PeugFra
- Start date
traintech55
Senior Member
For 1978 yes.
Back to the Brougham theme then!
As the low-down Custom 500 and the Broughamtastic LTD are not two end points on a gliding scale it makes little sense to compare year-on-year sales numbers for those trim levels. They compete in neatly separated categories, the former in the fleet market, the latter in the private market. Besides, fleet sales numbers are not readily available.
Chevrolet's fullsize is treated different in this respect: low-trim-level Impala and before that Bel Air, although also intended for the fleet market, are mentioned and pictured in the fullsize sales brochures. So let's see how the Brougham vs. fleet car conflict plays out at Chevrolet, expressed as percentages of total fullsize Chevy sales:
1974 Bel Air 5.42%
1974 Impala 64.22%
1974 Caprice Classic 30.36%
1975 Bel Air 5.28%
1975 Impala 59.08%
1975 Caprice Classic 35.63%
1976 Impala 56.44%
1976 Caprice Classic 43.56%
1977 Impala 48.41%
1977 Caprice Classic 51.60%
Top-trim-level Caprice Classic saw its share grow, year on year on year on year ... Exactly the opposite from what happened at Plymouth! To be honest, the upward trend for Caprice had already set in some years before. This growing preference for Broughamy offerings was a tendency that Plymouth failed to cash in on.
Although it's clear from these numbers that Chevrolet did not get dragged down by a fleet car image, it's not immediately clear how they did it. The following are just some suggestions:
1) Plymouth is mostly silent about its lowest trim level in the sales brochures, whereas Chevrolet's is expressly mentioned and pushed to budget-minded buyers, in ads as well as brochures. Straight from the 1974 Chevrolet fullsize brochure: "Consider the enviable luxury of the Caprice Classic. The persistent value of the top-selling Impala. The economy approach of the Bel Air." That's clear-cut market positioning that leaves nobody in doubt. Now get this from the Plymouth brochure: "Value can be beautiful, too. Especially when you consider that we've made a 360-cubic-inch V-8 engine standard equipment on every Fury III, Fury II and Fury I in '74." So we have three value leaders here?
2) Chevrolet details what has been left out of the lowest-level 1976 Impala S with respect to the main-stream Impala, as if it were a special operation carried out by the maker for just this purpose. With Plymouth it is more about adding that makes you shift trim level, like a buyer who would be picking an extra accessory. It's like the difference between a restaurant and a lunchtime self-service.
3) The trim levels have distinct names at Chevrolet (Bel Air/Impala/Caprice Classic). Plymouth first has mainly numbers (I/II/III/Gran), than suffixes (Gran Fury/Gran Fury Custom/Gran Fury Brougham). Chevrolet's and also Ford's naming practice relates more easily to different images. Chevrolet and Ford had already been carefully building a Brougham image around their top-trim-level names since the late Sixties, whereas Plymouth struggled to do so. First you had the VIP, than the Sport Fury Brougham (a package rather than a trim level), after that the Gran Sedan/Coupe, again with an optional Brougham package. Such a package did more for the interior than for exterior appeareance, though.
4) A clear distinction between trim levels is also present in styling. A 1974 Caprice Classic differs as much from a 1974 Impala, with distinct front and rear set-ups, as does 1974 Newport from New Yorker. For the 1974 Fury family you can't say that.
I like my 1974 Fury III a lot, and I like the fact that it is a Fury III and not a II or a Gran Sedan. But I don't like its given name. It doesn't conjure up any association at all and "Fury" is just fine with me. There you have it: as a Fury owner I don't distinguish trim levels when I talk about my car.
As the low-down Custom 500 and the Broughamtastic LTD are not two end points on a gliding scale it makes little sense to compare year-on-year sales numbers for those trim levels. They compete in neatly separated categories, the former in the fleet market, the latter in the private market. Besides, fleet sales numbers are not readily available.
Chevrolet's fullsize is treated different in this respect: low-trim-level Impala and before that Bel Air, although also intended for the fleet market, are mentioned and pictured in the fullsize sales brochures. So let's see how the Brougham vs. fleet car conflict plays out at Chevrolet, expressed as percentages of total fullsize Chevy sales:
1974 Bel Air 5.42%
1974 Impala 64.22%
1974 Caprice Classic 30.36%
1975 Bel Air 5.28%
1975 Impala 59.08%
1975 Caprice Classic 35.63%
1976 Impala 56.44%
1976 Caprice Classic 43.56%
1977 Impala 48.41%
1977 Caprice Classic 51.60%
Top-trim-level Caprice Classic saw its share grow, year on year on year on year ... Exactly the opposite from what happened at Plymouth! To be honest, the upward trend for Caprice had already set in some years before. This growing preference for Broughamy offerings was a tendency that Plymouth failed to cash in on.
Although it's clear from these numbers that Chevrolet did not get dragged down by a fleet car image, it's not immediately clear how they did it. The following are just some suggestions:
1) Plymouth is mostly silent about its lowest trim level in the sales brochures, whereas Chevrolet's is expressly mentioned and pushed to budget-minded buyers, in ads as well as brochures. Straight from the 1974 Chevrolet fullsize brochure: "Consider the enviable luxury of the Caprice Classic. The persistent value of the top-selling Impala. The economy approach of the Bel Air." That's clear-cut market positioning that leaves nobody in doubt. Now get this from the Plymouth brochure: "Value can be beautiful, too. Especially when you consider that we've made a 360-cubic-inch V-8 engine standard equipment on every Fury III, Fury II and Fury I in '74." So we have three value leaders here?
2) Chevrolet details what has been left out of the lowest-level 1976 Impala S with respect to the main-stream Impala, as if it were a special operation carried out by the maker for just this purpose. With Plymouth it is more about adding that makes you shift trim level, like a buyer who would be picking an extra accessory. It's like the difference between a restaurant and a lunchtime self-service.
3) The trim levels have distinct names at Chevrolet (Bel Air/Impala/Caprice Classic). Plymouth first has mainly numbers (I/II/III/Gran), than suffixes (Gran Fury/Gran Fury Custom/Gran Fury Brougham). Chevrolet's and also Ford's naming practice relates more easily to different images. Chevrolet and Ford had already been carefully building a Brougham image around their top-trim-level names since the late Sixties, whereas Plymouth struggled to do so. First you had the VIP, than the Sport Fury Brougham (a package rather than a trim level), after that the Gran Sedan/Coupe, again with an optional Brougham package. Such a package did more for the interior than for exterior appeareance, though.
4) A clear distinction between trim levels is also present in styling. A 1974 Caprice Classic differs as much from a 1974 Impala, with distinct front and rear set-ups, as does 1974 Newport from New Yorker. For the 1974 Fury family you can't say that.
I like my 1974 Fury III a lot, and I like the fact that it is a Fury III and not a II or a Gran Sedan. But I don't like its given name. It doesn't conjure up any association at all and "Fury" is just fine with me. There you have it: as a Fury owner I don't distinguish trim levels when I talk about my car.
Apparently I'm not the only one referring to my fullsize Plymouth as simply a "Fury". Popular Science (February 1974) has a comparative test of the four contenders in the low-end fullsize market, and what are they called in the first table (p. 24)? "Ambassador", "Caprice", "Ford LTD" and "Fury". Or in the caption of the opening photograph? "Ford LTD", "AMC Ambassador", "Chevrolet Caprice" and "Plymouth Fury". Only in the last table you learn it was actually a "Plymouth Fury Gran" they had been testing, specifically the "Sedan" trim level.
This may seem like nitpicking, but naming is directly related to the prominence of concepts. If a concept doesn't stand out, it tends not to be named separately. To the outside world, a Fury is just a Fury, no matter what fine distinctions the manufacturer may have introduced between the trim levels.
This may seem like nitpicking, but naming is directly related to the prominence of concepts. If a concept doesn't stand out, it tends not to be named separately. To the outside world, a Fury is just a Fury, no matter what fine distinctions the manufacturer may have introduced between the trim levels.
Back in 2013 Steve Salmi at Indie Auto argued it was the new styling that did Plymouth in. The 1974 Plymouth is described as "the most generic car in that brand's history" and a consequence of "slavishly copying General Motors". The resemblance to Buick was noted right from the start, but reviewer John Fuchs (Motor Trend Magazine, November 1973) saw this as an advantage rather than a drawback and judged the 1974 Fury "probably the best-looking Plymouth in years". So much for conflicting opinions, now the facts.
Taking looks as a determining factor, this should be visible especially in the 1974 numbers and should also apply, at least partly, to the other formalized C-bodies. Here we go again with market share comparisons:
1973 Dodge Polara/Monaco 19.77%
1973 Chrysler Newport 26.82%
1973 Chrysler New Yorker 15.94%
1973 Imperial LeBaron 5.78%
1973 Plymouth Fury 12.26%
1974 Dodge Monaco 22.86%
1974 Chrysler Newport 24.74%
1974 Chrysler New Yorker 15.77%
1974 Imperial LeBaron 6.45%
1974 Plymouth Fury 9.58%
(Monaco competitors: Mercury Monterey/Marquis, Pontiac Catalina/Bonneville/Grand Ville; Newport competitors: Buick LeSabre, Oldsmobile Delta 88; New Yorker competitors: Buick Electra 225, Oldsmobile 98; LeBaron competitors: Cadillac deVille, Lincoln Continental. The production figures these proportions are based on are from Flory for non-Chryco products and the highest I could find in any source for Chryco products.)
Monaco did rather well (+ 3.09 percentage points), LeBaron gained only a fraction (+ 0.67), New Yorker remained practically stable (- 0.17), Newport lost some ground (- 2.08) and Plymouth saw the biggest 1973-to-1974 drop among the Formals (- 2.68). Although market reaction is not uniform, apart from Monaco that's not the healthy market share gain that usually comes with the introduction of fully restyled car lines. The 1974 buying public's response to the formal styling was luke-warm at best.
Plymouth was affected most, although its side and rear styling was very similar to big-time winner Monaco. If one accepts the idea that these market share changes were driven by appearance alone, the resemblance to Buick cannot have been the problem.
Taking looks as a determining factor, this should be visible especially in the 1974 numbers and should also apply, at least partly, to the other formalized C-bodies. Here we go again with market share comparisons:
1973 Dodge Polara/Monaco 19.77%
1973 Chrysler Newport 26.82%
1973 Chrysler New Yorker 15.94%
1973 Imperial LeBaron 5.78%
1973 Plymouth Fury 12.26%
1974 Dodge Monaco 22.86%
1974 Chrysler Newport 24.74%
1974 Chrysler New Yorker 15.77%
1974 Imperial LeBaron 6.45%
1974 Plymouth Fury 9.58%
(Monaco competitors: Mercury Monterey/Marquis, Pontiac Catalina/Bonneville/Grand Ville; Newport competitors: Buick LeSabre, Oldsmobile Delta 88; New Yorker competitors: Buick Electra 225, Oldsmobile 98; LeBaron competitors: Cadillac deVille, Lincoln Continental. The production figures these proportions are based on are from Flory for non-Chryco products and the highest I could find in any source for Chryco products.)
Monaco did rather well (+ 3.09 percentage points), LeBaron gained only a fraction (+ 0.67), New Yorker remained practically stable (- 0.17), Newport lost some ground (- 2.08) and Plymouth saw the biggest 1973-to-1974 drop among the Formals (- 2.68). Although market reaction is not uniform, apart from Monaco that's not the healthy market share gain that usually comes with the introduction of fully restyled car lines. The 1974 buying public's response to the formal styling was luke-warm at best.
Plymouth was affected most, although its side and rear styling was very similar to big-time winner Monaco. If one accepts the idea that these market share changes were driven by appearance alone, the resemblance to Buick cannot have been the problem.
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GregG48203
Active Member
It would seem more accurate to compare 1973 Polara & Monaco to 1974 Monaco, since the Polara model went away after 1973.
January 1974 there was a piece of bad news for the Fury. William Haddon, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, presented the results of their low-speed crash tests before a House commerce subcommittee. AMC Ambassador, Chevrolet Impala, Ford Galaxie and Plymouth Fury (Fury III going by the VINs in the attachments) performed different types of crashes and then the repair costs were assessed. And in every single crash category, Fury was worst of class.
Remember this from the 1974 sales brochure?
That's $119.75, $1,061.99 or $1,783.96 please, depending on whether you were doing 5, 10 or 15 mph!
In addition to that, the report noted for the 5-mph crash "the bumper did not extend out to its original location. Consequently, the gas tank filler door ... could not be opened." But that's nothing compared to the consequences of the 15-mph crash: "This jammed door ... and a ruptured fuel tank helped make this low-speed crash both very expensive and very hazardous for potential occupants had a fire started."
As these crash test results were widely reported in the press, some buying decisions will have been influenced by this.
Talking about extra care in engineering making a difference! Back in November 1971 Sydney L. Terry, Vice President, Safety and Emissions, had already stated "that the DOT's bumper standard for 1974, even while formally dealing only with occupant safety, can be met only by fully protecting the car against damage as well." Apparently in the mean time the engineers had found a way to make that two completely unrelated issues. Well, not completely: the stuck gas tank filler door was judged in violation of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 215.
William Haddon was a rather grumpy man. But I like his description of the 1974 Fury grille as "French pastry", summing up both its esthetics and impact resistance.
Remember this from the 1974 sales brochure?
That's $119.75, $1,061.99 or $1,783.96 please, depending on whether you were doing 5, 10 or 15 mph!
In addition to that, the report noted for the 5-mph crash "the bumper did not extend out to its original location. Consequently, the gas tank filler door ... could not be opened." But that's nothing compared to the consequences of the 15-mph crash: "This jammed door ... and a ruptured fuel tank helped make this low-speed crash both very expensive and very hazardous for potential occupants had a fire started."
As these crash test results were widely reported in the press, some buying decisions will have been influenced by this.
Talking about extra care in engineering making a difference! Back in November 1971 Sydney L. Terry, Vice President, Safety and Emissions, had already stated "that the DOT's bumper standard for 1974, even while formally dealing only with occupant safety, can be met only by fully protecting the car against damage as well." Apparently in the mean time the engineers had found a way to make that two completely unrelated issues. Well, not completely: the stuck gas tank filler door was judged in violation of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 215.
William Haddon was a rather grumpy man. But I like his description of the 1974 Fury grille as "French pastry", summing up both its esthetics and impact resistance.
The final blow for Plymouth, but also for many other fullsize and overweight car lines, was the enforcement of CAFE starting with the 1978 model year. I'm surprised nobody has brought this up here, including myself. As the enactment of CAFE in December 1975 is seen as a consequence of the autumn 1973 - winter 1974 oil embargo and ensuing energy crisis, all in-depth articles on C-body formals start with the ritual statement that they hit the market at exactly the wrong time.
Not exactly. Their time was up three months before they reached the showrooms. Domestic oil supply was already tight, resulting in distribution bottlenecks and shortages at gas stations during the summers of 1972 and 1973. Growing dependency on imported oil was likewise seen as a negative already before the embargo. May 30, 1973 a bill was introduced by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings that addressed these problems and that once enacted - but it never was - would have been called the "Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Act". During the hearings Fred L. Hartley, President of the Union Oil Co., California, suggested that every single manufacturer should achieve a sales-weighted average mileage of 18 mpg for its cars, instead of introducing industry-wide minimum mileages for various vehicle classes, with every single car having to meet its class standard. Chrysler witness Sidney L. Terry was not adverse to Hartley's idea and that day of June 21, 1973, the CAFE set-up was born.
Once Chrysler and the others knew what was brewing they started to prepare for the inevitable. Realising it could not keep all full-size car lines, Chryco decided to save at least their nameplates by sticking them on the B-bodies. At the start of the 1975 model year, the Fury had become small, and that's what we all had been waiting for anyway:
Yet it could "take care of a family of six" (five shown). Rather than downright "small", in the 1976 sales brochure it is called "smaller", "smaller-than-full-size", and "family-sized". For the 1977 model year the marketing spin shifts from "small(er)" to "larger": "Our goal was to design a mid-size car that would appeal to buyers who traditionally have sought larger cars" (Richard D. McLaughlin, Sales Vice President). In the same vein the 1977 B-bodies were positioned as cheaper competitors of GM's newly downsized fullsize lines. By the traditional measure of wheelbase, yes, but not by the new EPA measure of interior passenger volume.
As an industry analyst stated at the end of Small Fury's first model year: "... [Chrysler] could approximate its competitors' plans through a less expensive move of dropping big cars and renaming intermediates with familiar family car names". The first move in this chess game was carried out well before CAFE was enshrined in law, which means that Chryco was already reacting to the bills and hearings that lead op to this gamechanger. Building a family-car image around a midsize car takes time.
Not exactly. Their time was up three months before they reached the showrooms. Domestic oil supply was already tight, resulting in distribution bottlenecks and shortages at gas stations during the summers of 1972 and 1973. Growing dependency on imported oil was likewise seen as a negative already before the embargo. May 30, 1973 a bill was introduced by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings that addressed these problems and that once enacted - but it never was - would have been called the "Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Act". During the hearings Fred L. Hartley, President of the Union Oil Co., California, suggested that every single manufacturer should achieve a sales-weighted average mileage of 18 mpg for its cars, instead of introducing industry-wide minimum mileages for various vehicle classes, with every single car having to meet its class standard. Chrysler witness Sidney L. Terry was not adverse to Hartley's idea and that day of June 21, 1973, the CAFE set-up was born.
Once Chrysler and the others knew what was brewing they started to prepare for the inevitable. Realising it could not keep all full-size car lines, Chryco decided to save at least their nameplates by sticking them on the B-bodies. At the start of the 1975 model year, the Fury had become small, and that's what we all had been waiting for anyway:
Yet it could "take care of a family of six" (five shown). Rather than downright "small", in the 1976 sales brochure it is called "smaller", "smaller-than-full-size", and "family-sized". For the 1977 model year the marketing spin shifts from "small(er)" to "larger": "Our goal was to design a mid-size car that would appeal to buyers who traditionally have sought larger cars" (Richard D. McLaughlin, Sales Vice President). In the same vein the 1977 B-bodies were positioned as cheaper competitors of GM's newly downsized fullsize lines. By the traditional measure of wheelbase, yes, but not by the new EPA measure of interior passenger volume.
As an industry analyst stated at the end of Small Fury's first model year: "... [Chrysler] could approximate its competitors' plans through a less expensive move of dropping big cars and renaming intermediates with familiar family car names". The first move in this chess game was carried out well before CAFE was enshrined in law, which means that Chryco was already reacting to the bills and hearings that lead op to this gamechanger. Building a family-car image around a midsize car takes time.
cbarge
World Famous Barge in a Budget
GregG48203
Active Member
By June 15, 1975, the news was out: "We have been told the C bodies (big cars) are going to be dropped in the 1978-model year. The decision has been made, but management may delay the plan a year if sales improve. ... the plan filtered down from top management to department heads about a week ago." It must have been one of the last decisions by the Townsend-Riccardo-Cafiero triumvirate, taken just before Townsend's three-week vacation in June and subsequent shake-up of Chryco's top management structure, announced July 4. So at least we know WHO killed Plymouth's formal.
Chrysler's Richard K. Brown immediately decried the report as irresponsible and misinforming the public, but just the same, at the start of CAFE fullsize Gran Fury and Royal Monaco were eliminated from the line-up. When that line-up was presented, no observer was in doubt that the 1978 product mix was all about meeting the CAFE standard.
Without CAFE the manufacturers could have gone on offering fullsize car lines with their high profit margins, at the same time choosing or declining to produce low-profit fuel-economic models in accordance with customer demand. From the start of the 1978 model year the latter part became "in accordance with CAFE demand". Says Ford's John Deaver: "product mix decisions are now determined by the number of large and medium-sized cars the company believes it can sell, and then by the number of small cars it needs to produce/sell in order to meet CAFE requirements".
At Chrysler the reasoning was the other way around, whereby fullsize cars took a back seat to small cars. Biased towards the small car market for several years now, its 1977 long-range plan stated that Chryco would remain a producer of a complete line of cars in order to offset smaller profit margins on its subcompacts with higher profit margins on its full-sized models. The unstated alternative here was leaving the fullsize market altogether, like was already being rumoured for some the time (and what eventually would happen with the 1982 line-up).
Chrysler's Richard K. Brown immediately decried the report as irresponsible and misinforming the public, but just the same, at the start of CAFE fullsize Gran Fury and Royal Monaco were eliminated from the line-up. When that line-up was presented, no observer was in doubt that the 1978 product mix was all about meeting the CAFE standard.
Without CAFE the manufacturers could have gone on offering fullsize car lines with their high profit margins, at the same time choosing or declining to produce low-profit fuel-economic models in accordance with customer demand. From the start of the 1978 model year the latter part became "in accordance with CAFE demand". Says Ford's John Deaver: "product mix decisions are now determined by the number of large and medium-sized cars the company believes it can sell, and then by the number of small cars it needs to produce/sell in order to meet CAFE requirements".
At Chrysler the reasoning was the other way around, whereby fullsize cars took a back seat to small cars. Biased towards the small car market for several years now, its 1977 long-range plan stated that Chryco would remain a producer of a complete line of cars in order to offset smaller profit margins on its subcompacts with higher profit margins on its full-sized models. The unstated alternative here was leaving the fullsize market altogether, like was already being rumoured for some the time (and what eventually would happen with the 1982 line-up).
cbarge
World Famous Barge in a Budget
Fratzog
Old Man with a Hat
With the impressive amount of research done and info provided this thread hardly belongs in the "Off Topic Forums". While not a "formal" guy I believe the info you have compiled here will be invaluable to those who love these cars. The history is an interesting read.
Let me ramble on, then!
Although the 1977 long-range plan was formulated with the R-bodies in mind, the same reasoning explains the choices made for 1978. In the preceding years, the Chrysler proportion of the C-bodies had been on a steady rise:
1974 35.98%
1975 40.89%
1976 57.52%
1977 59.18%
It sold best of all and, although good for only 13.5 mpg, was the C-body with the highest profit margin. Besides, the new-for-1978 compacts Plymouth Horizon/Dodge Omni, coming in at 27.2 mpg, needed to be assembled somewhere. Instead of building a new assembly, the Belvidere assembly was converted to the tune of $40 million, ousting the Plymouth and Dodge C-bodies there. That solved two problems at the same time. The elimination of the Town & Country, also built at Belvidere, was more collateral damage than anything else. For 1977 it had posted its highest production number yet as a Formal (8,569).
Although the 1977 long-range plan was formulated with the R-bodies in mind, the same reasoning explains the choices made for 1978. In the preceding years, the Chrysler proportion of the C-bodies had been on a steady rise:
1974 35.98%
1975 40.89%
1976 57.52%
1977 59.18%
It sold best of all and, although good for only 13.5 mpg, was the C-body with the highest profit margin. Besides, the new-for-1978 compacts Plymouth Horizon/Dodge Omni, coming in at 27.2 mpg, needed to be assembled somewhere. Instead of building a new assembly, the Belvidere assembly was converted to the tune of $40 million, ousting the Plymouth and Dodge C-bodies there. That solved two problems at the same time. The elimination of the Town & Country, also built at Belvidere, was more collateral damage than anything else. For 1977 it had posted its highest production number yet as a Formal (8,569).
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GregG48203
Active Member
I wonder if the difference in the Chrysler proportion is a result of the disappearance of the Imperial; particularly from 1975 to '76.
That's certainly part of the picture, but the main story is the sharp decline in Plymouth and Dodge model year production numbers:
1975 Plymouth 72,801 = 29.34%
1975 Dodge 65,039 = 26.21%
1975 Chrysler 101,454 = 40.89%
1975 Imperial 8,830 = 3.56%
1975 Total Chryco 248,124
1976 Plymouth 39,510 = 22.35%
1976 Dodge 35,591 = 20.13%
1976 Chrysler 101,691 = 57.52%
1976 Total Chryco 176,792
On a year-to-year basis, Plymouth was down 45.7% and Dodge 45.3%, whereas Chrysler remained practically unchanged. For the full-size market as a whole, 1976 was a year of slight growth, which makes the performance of Plymouth and Dodge all the more disappointing.
1975 Plymouth 72,801 = 29.34%
1975 Dodge 65,039 = 26.21%
1975 Chrysler 101,454 = 40.89%
1975 Imperial 8,830 = 3.56%
1975 Total Chryco 248,124
1976 Plymouth 39,510 = 22.35%
1976 Dodge 35,591 = 20.13%
1976 Chrysler 101,691 = 57.52%
1976 Total Chryco 176,792
On a year-to-year basis, Plymouth was down 45.7% and Dodge 45.3%, whereas Chrysler remained practically unchanged. For the full-size market as a whole, 1976 was a year of slight growth, which makes the performance of Plymouth and Dodge all the more disappointing.
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Fast rewind to the data base for all this. Up until now I used model year production numbers as a proxy for the market situation, simply because they are easier to get at. I now hit upon the U.S. calender year sales data from Ward's Automotive Yearbooks, so let's see if the Plymouth story as a failing contender in the low-priced field is repeated there:
MY production:
1973: 12.26%
1974: 9.58%
1975: 8.64%
1976: 4.75%
1977: 4.16%
(from post #31)
CY sales:
1973: 11.95%
1974: 9.62%
1975: 8.30%
1976: 5.47%
1977: 2.96%
1978: 0.10%
The last line, representing 980 Gran Furys, tells that it was a slow mover, at least by then. Generally, clearing a model year inventory can take up to 18 months. Other things to keep in mind: CY sales contain a mix of several MY cars and the overall sales number will be lower than the overall production number, due to cars sold outside the U.S.
1973-1975 trends are rather similar for MY production and CY sales, only the 1976-1977 trends differ, with a more gradual, but still devastating decline in sales as opposed to production, with its sharp drop and then holding steady. It seems like there was a backlog of 1975 MY cars to sell that only cleared in the 1976 CY. Remember that it was towards the end of the 1975 MY run that the decision to axe the C-bodies was taken. The due-to-slow-sales approach. 1976-1977 production was adjusted accordingly. So I'm not going to worry about that 1975-to-1976 production cliff fall anymore.
MY production:
1973: 12.26%
1974: 9.58%
1975: 8.64%
1976: 4.75%
1977: 4.16%
(from post #31)
CY sales:
1973: 11.95%
1974: 9.62%
1975: 8.30%
1976: 5.47%
1977: 2.96%
1978: 0.10%
The last line, representing 980 Gran Furys, tells that it was a slow mover, at least by then. Generally, clearing a model year inventory can take up to 18 months. Other things to keep in mind: CY sales contain a mix of several MY cars and the overall sales number will be lower than the overall production number, due to cars sold outside the U.S.
1973-1975 trends are rather similar for MY production and CY sales, only the 1976-1977 trends differ, with a more gradual, but still devastating decline in sales as opposed to production, with its sharp drop and then holding steady. It seems like there was a backlog of 1975 MY cars to sell that only cleared in the 1976 CY. Remember that it was towards the end of the 1975 MY run that the decision to axe the C-bodies was taken. The due-to-slow-sales approach. 1976-1977 production was adjusted accordingly. So I'm not going to worry about that 1975-to-1976 production cliff fall anymore.
Plymouth's C-body was geared toward fleet sales, especially its base trim level and the PK series. However, the 1970s fleet market was an uncomfortable place to be for a fullsize car. First of all, growth in the fleet market was lower than in the overall market. Business cars increased 8% between 1970 and 1976, while the total car population increased 24% during the same period. However, a high turn-over rate and a steady customer base can make up for that.
Second, the overall 1970s shift away from fullsize was actually more pronounced and set in earlier in the corporate fleet market. Since 1974, standard-sized fleet cars were being replaced with intermediate-sized cars, intermediates gaining a bigger share in fleets compared to their share in the overall market. After all, exterior dimensions, fuel economy and resale value are important real-world criteria for fleet owners. On these accounts fullsize cars did not do well.
The 1975-1978 Ford Custom 500 production numbers, a fleet-only model by then, give a good picture of the decline in the fullsize fleet market:
1975: 37,973
1976: 35,117
1977: 11,127
1978: 5,599
From 1977 on, Ford and Plymouth fullsize fleet offerings competed with the downsized GM models, whose outside dimensions were very similar to the traditional intermediates already favoured by fleet owners. Although the total full-sized share in new fleet acquisitions increased from 24% in 1976 to 29% in 1977, the gain was due to increases by the GM full-sizes during 1977.
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